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PAY FOR PLAY IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS: WHY COST OF
ATTENDANCE?
Danielle Day*
Abstract
There is an ongoing dialogue about the most desirable model for
compensation of collegiate student-athletes. The central question is
whether the current model-capping compensation at cost of
attendance-is the best method for all parties involved. Other options
include establishing a National Collegiate Athletic Association-wide
grant-in-aid cap, implementing a free market for student-athlete
compensation, or allowing student athletes to be paid by third parties for
use of their name, image, and likeness. In recent years, state legislatures
forced the NCAA to consider revising its rules to permit these kinds of
payments from third parties. This Note argues Congress or the NCAA
should revise current rules and regulations to create a meaningful
statutory definition of cost of attendance and implement a more effective
regulatory structure to limit manipulation of individual institution's cost
of attendance, while complying with the Ninth Circuit's intent to limit
compensation to education-related expenses. This option, compared to a
free market or allowing payments from third parties, is a middle ground
allowing student-athletes to be compensated for the maximum of their
educational expenses, but not in over-the-top amounts that would put the
entirety of college sports in jeopardy.
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INTRODUCTION

As the years have passed, the debate about the best model for
compensation of college student-athletes has grown. These debates
typically focus on the same few models: establishing a National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)-wide grant-in-aid cap,
implementing a free market for student athletic compensation, and
allowing student athletes to be paid by third parties for use of their name,
image, and likeness (NIL). This debate reached the courts in O'Bannon
v. NCAA, 1 where the Ninth Circuit capped grant-in-aid, the total amount
2
of an athletic scholarship for student athletes, at "cost of attendance."
Cost of attendance (COA), broadly defined and poorly regulated, is each
school's estimate of what it costs to attend their school for the fall and
spring semesters.
This Note will argue that best model for compensation of college
student-athletes is to reform the meaning and implementation of COA. It
should be reformed to comply with the Ninth Circuit's intent, to base
grants-in-aid on educational expenses. Implementing a more meaningful
1. 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
2. O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d at 1074.
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statutory definition of COA in combination with increasing the regulation
of COA calculation will allow COA to act in accordance to its intended
use as a true estimate of educational expenses for student-athletes. This
Note is divided into three main sections. Section I examines the
O'Bannon decision; Section II explores the history and current status of
COA, and Section III discusses each of the commonly proposed
alternative compensation models in relationship to this Note's preferred
model, reformed COA.
I. THE O'BANNONDECISION

In 2009, Ed O'Bannon, a former college basketball player, brought a
suit against the NCAA and the Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC)
arguing that certain NCAA-imposed restrictions functioned as illegal
restraints of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 3 O'Bannon had
recently discovered that a video game character looked just like him,
down to the jersey number and college represented, even though he had
not given the company permission to use his NIL. 4
A. DistrictCourt Decision in O'Bannon
After a fourteen-day trial, the district court concluded, "that the
NCAA's rules prohibiting student-athletes from receiving compensation
for their NILs violate[d] Section 1 of the Sherman Act." 5 To reach this
conclusion, the court first determined that "the NCAA's rules impose[d]
a restraint on competition." 6 In anti-trust cases, restraints on competition
are acceptable as long as they are justified.7 For a restraint to be justified
the proponent of it must show that "the anticompetitive aspects of the
challenged practice outweigh its procompetitive effects." 8 The NCAA
proposed four procompetitive purposes to justify the challenged
restraints, but they only satisfied their burden on two of the four.9 Those
two were "preserving the popularity of the NCAA's product by
promoting its current understanding of amateurism and . . . integrating
academics and athletics."1 0 The burden then shifted to the Plaintiffs to
show that these two procompetitive purposes could have been achieved

3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
4. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
5.

Id.

at 1056; O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007 (N.D.

Cal. 2014).
6. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999.
7. See id.
8. See id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Montana Power

Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)).
9. /d at 1004.
10. /d. at 1005.
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through less restrictive alternatives than the NCAA prohibiting studentathletes from receiving compensation for their NILs. 1
The court ultimately implemented two of the Plaintiff's proposed less
restrictive alternatives.1 2 The first required that the NCAA allow schools
to give their student-athletes stipends up to the school's full cost of
attendance and the second required the NCAA to allow schools to hold
in trust "a limited and equal share of its licensing revenue to be distributed
3
[after] student-athletes . .. leave college or their eligibility expires."'
To start its analysis, the court discussed each of the NCAA-imposed
restraints challenged in O'Bannon: (1) the restraint on student-athletes
receiving compensation for use of their NIL; (2) the cap for an athletic
scholarship being a full grant-in-aid that-at the time of O'Bannon,
athletic scholarship was limited to tuition, fees, room, board, and books;
(3) the cap on each student-athlete's total financial aid, including outside
aid, at cost of attendance;' 4 (4) the prohibition on compensation to
student-athletes from third parties for athletic performance, skills, or
ability related to athletics; (5) the limit on compensation from off-campus
jobs to an amount commensurate with a non-athlete who completed the
same work; and (6) the bar keeping student-athletes from endorsing any
15
product or service regardless of whether they are being compensated.
To justify the challenged restraints, the NCAA had to assert reasons
that the procompetitive benefits of the restraints outweighed the
anticompetitive aspects. The NCAA's four reasons were: (1) the
preservation of amateurism that promotes consumer demand for college
football and basketball;1 6 (2) maintenance of the competitive balance that
also promotes consumer demand;1 7 (3) integration of athletics and
academics;' 8 and (4) increasing the number of opportunities for games to
schools and student-athletes.1 9 The NCAA met their burden of proof for
both the preservation of amateurism and the integration of athletics and
academics procompetitive purposes by showing that the procompetitive
20
benefits of the restrictions outweighed the anticompetitive aspects.
Accordingly, the burden shifted to the Plaintiffs to propose less
2
restrictive alternatives to the challenged restraints. 1 The less restrictive
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
(citations

Id. at 1004 (internal quotations omitted).
O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 972.
See id. at 973.
Id. at 979.
O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 979-80.
Id. at 981.
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1004 (citing Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1410 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991)
omitted)).
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alternatives had to be virtually as effective at serving the same objective
without significantly increasing the cost. 2 2 The Plaintiffs proposed three
less restrictive alternatives. 2 3 They suggested that the NCAA could:
(1) raise the grant-in-aid limit to allow schools to award
stipends, derived from specified sources of licensing
revenue, to student-athletes; (2) allow schools to deposit a
share of licensing revenue into a trust fund for studentathletes which could be paid after the student-athletes
graduate or leave school for other reasons; or (3) permit
student-athletes to receive limited compensation for thirdparty endorsements approved by their schools. 2 4
The court ultimately required the NCAA to implement two changes
to their rules. The first was allowing each NCAA school to increase the
value of an athletic scholarship, including stipends, but the court did not
permit the cap to be lower than each institution's COA.2 5 The court found
that "there is no evidence that this cap will significantly increase costs;
indeed, the NCAA already permits schools to fund student-athletes' full
cost of attendance." 26 Although the NCAA had previously permitted
schools to provide athletic scholarships up to COA, schools typically
limited their scholarships to tuition and fees, room and board, books and
supplies. 2 7 Increasing the grant-in-aid cap to COA did increase the
financial burden on athletic departments because it required schools to
raise the minimum scholarship amount to full COA. 28 Increasing the
minimum scholarship automatically increases the bottom line of any
athletic department.
In addition to raising the grant-in-aid cap, the NCAA had to allow
member schools or conferences to "offer[] to deposit a limited share of
licensing revenue .in trust for their Division I football and basketball
recruits, payable when they leave school, or their eligibility expires." 29
The NCAA could cap the amount a school could put in the trust, but it
could not be less than $5,000 per year per athlete. 3 The court found that
no "procompetitive goals [would] be undermined by allowing modest
22. Id. at 1004-05 (citing County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty.

Hosp.,

236 F.3d 1148 (9th

Cir. 2001)).
23. Id at 982.
24. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 982.
25. See id. at 1008.
26. O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015).

27. Id. at 1054.
28. How Colleges Figure "Cost of Attendance,"

COLL. DATA, https://www.collegedata
.com/resources/pay-your-way/how-colleges-figure-cost-of-attendance#:~:text=As%20dictated
%20by%20Congress%2C%20the,reflect%20changes%20to%20these%20costs (last visited Mar.

27, 2019).
29. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.

30. Id.
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payment[s]" from a trust. 3 1 During the trial, a witness for the NCAA
testified that the effects of payments to student-athletes would be
minimized if the payments were capped at a few thousand dollars a
year.32 The court also permitted the NCAA to enforce existing rules and
student-athletes from monetizing the
adopt new ones to keep current
33
college.
in
enrolled
trusts while
B. Ninth Circuit Court Decision
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion
that the NCAA is subject to antitrust scrutiny and emphasized that the
34
NCAA is required to comply with the Sherman Act. It also affirmed the
district court's holding that the NCAA's "existing compensation rules
violate[d] Section 1 of the Sherman Act" by employing regulations that
were "more restrictive than necessary to maintain its tradition of
35
amateurism in support of the college sports market." The Ninth Circuit
vacated the portion of district court's ruling permitting the NCAA to
allow member schools to pay certain student-athletes using deferred
compensation but otherwise, it affirmed the district court's holding
36
increasing the grant-in-aid cap.
1. Increase the Grant-In-Aid Cap to Cost of Attendance
In affirming an increase to the grant-in-aid cap, the Ninth Circuit
found that "[t]he district court did not clearly err [by finding that it] would
be a substantially less restrictive alternative to the current compensation
rules." 37 The evidence presented during the trial demonstrated there
would likely be little effect on a student-athlete's amateurism by
increasing the grant-in-aid cap to cost of attendance. 3 8 Dr. Mark Emmert,
President of the NCAA, testified that the extra money given to student39
athletes would still go towards "legitimate costs to attend school."
The court's focus on the effect of this change on student-athlete's
amateurism was rooted in Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma.4 0 In that case, the United States Supreme
Court found that the NCAA plays a critical role in maintaining
amateurism in college sports and gave the NCAA "ample latitude" to
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1075-76, 1079.
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1074-75.
Id. at 1075 (internal quotations omitted).
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073.
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perform that task. 4 1 It held that NCAA student-athletes must not be paid
to preserve the "character and quality of the product." 4 2 The product, as
defined by the Court, was college football. 43 Maintenance of this product
could not be achieved through unilaterally accepted rules, therefore the
NCAA was needed to create rules that enabled the product to exist.44 The
NCAA's continued commitment to limiting payments to student-athletes
to only those related to legitimate education-related expenses is within
the "ample latitude" given to them by the Court.45
No evidence was presented in the district court to show that raising
the grant-in-aid cap would affect consumer demand for collegiate sports
or that it "would impede student-athlete's integration into their academic
communities," two of the procompetitive benefits of the NCAA's
restraints. 4 6 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the increased grant-in-aid cap
because it was substantially less restrictive than the previous NCAAimposed restraint on grant-in-aid while maintaining the amateur status of
student-athletes and retaining consumer demand. 47
At the time, neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit focused on
the details of COA other than its obvious relationship to educational
expenses. The courts' narrow focus on COA's clear relationship to
educational expenses came from "the NCAA's own standards, [that]
student-athletes remain amateurs as long as any money paid to them goes
to cover legitimate educational expenses." 48 Although, in theory, COA
includes only education-related expenses therefore continuing studentathlete's amateurism, 4 9 neither of the courts looked at the inadequacies of
the current COA calculation or regulation procedures. 50
2. Deferred $5,000 Trust
The district court found that a "viable alter[n]ative to allow[ing]
students to receive NIL cash payments"51 was to provide, in the form of
a trust upon graduation or expiration of eligibility, $5,000 per athlete per
year of athletic participation.5 2 The Ninth Circuit did not agree that this
41. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.

85, 120 (1984).
42. Id. at 102 (internal quotations omitted).

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id at 101.
Id. at 102.
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079 (citing Bd of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120).
Id at 1075.
Id at 1074-75.
Id at 1075.
Id.

50. Id. at 1079;

O'Bannon v. Nat'l

Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1009 (N.D.

Cal. 2014).
51. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076.
52. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
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was a less restrictive alternative because the payments would not be
tethered to educational expenses.5 3 The NCAA's continued effort to limit
payments to student-athletes to only those related to their educational
expenses has been recognized as within the "ample latitude" to maintain
the "product" of college football. 4 This court did not "agree that a rule
permitting schools to pay students pure cash compensation and a rule
forbidding them from paying NIL compensation are both equally
55
effective in promoting amateurism and preserving consumer demand."
The district court found that these deferred cash payments would promote
amateurism as effectively as not paying student-athletes, but the Ninth
Circuit disagreed pointing to the district court's failure to consider that
"not paying student-athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs."56
"The difference between offering student-athletes education-related
compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational
expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap." 57
In considering whether the trust fund alternative would be "virtually
as effective" at promoting amateurism, the standard for a less restrictive
alternative, the Ninth Circuit described the evidence seen by the district
court as "threadbare." 5 8 Rather than directly supporting a $5,000 trust
fund, the evidence simply demonstrated that making large payments to
student-athletes would "harm consumer demand [for college sports] more
than smaller payments would." 59 The NCAA admitted evidence
addressing whether payments of $200,000 or $20,000 would affect
consumer demand for college sports "[i]nstead of asking whether making
small payments to student-athletes served the same procompetitive
purposes as making no payments." 60 In fact, Neal Pilson, the NCAA's
broadcasting industry expert, 6 1 was pushed to produce a reasonable
number for payments to student-athletes. 62 He finally replied, "I [will]
tell you that a million dollars would trouble me and $5,000 wouldn't."63
On review, this court emphasized that this testimony was the main
evidentiary support for the district court's $5,000 minimum.64

53. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076.
54. Id. at 1062 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 10102, 120 (1984)).
55. Id at 1076.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1078.
58. Id at 1076-77.
59. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1077.
60. Id
61. O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
62. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078.
63. Id; see also O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983.
64. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078.
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Anecdotal evidence was brought comparing public dislike of
increasing baseball salaries to the future of college athletics if studentathletes are permitted to make more money. 65 Increasing student-athlete
pay was also compared to the period after professional athletes were first
allowed to compete at the Olympics, which had previously been
composed of only amateurs. 66 When the court considered that there was
still a large consumer demand for both professional baseball and the
Olympics, it was not convinced by the analogies that large payments
would have a profound impact on the amateurism and decrease consumer
demand for college sports. 6 7
In the end, the Ninth Circuit vacated the portion of the district court's
injunction requiring the NCAA to permit member institutions to provide
a portion of revenue to student-athletes in the form of a trust upon leaving
college or their eligibility expiring. 68 Otherwise, it affirmed the
requirement that the NCAA raise the grant-in-aid cap to COA, allowing
schools to distribute stipends up to COA to their student-athletes. 69
II. COLLEGIATE COST OF ATTENDANCE
A. History of Cost ofAttendance
Since its creation, COA has not been the subject of much
controversy. 7 0 Established by the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA),
Congress capped the maximum amount that a student could take out in
federally-insured loans from private lenders; a cap that was the same
regardless of the institution attended. 7 1 The Pell Grant System,
established in 1972, created new loans that covered the difference
between COA and a student's Estimated Family Contribution. 72 COA for
these loans was based on each student's personal expense, not on the
individual institution's estimated cost. 73
By 1976, Congress expanded the use of COA to include federallybacked student loans, the loan limits were still based on each student's
65. Id. at 1077.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 1079.
Id.

70. See Kim Dancy & Rachel Fishman, Cost of Attendance: More Than Tuition, NASFAA
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.nasfaa.org/news-item/10511/Student AidPerspectivesCost_of_
Attendance More_ThanTuition [https://perma.cc/2W5R-LZSB].

71. Kim Dancy & Rachel Fishman, A Legislative History: Why is Cost of Attendance so
Complicated?, NEW AM. (May 4, 2016), https://www.newamericaorg/education-policy/
edcentral/more-than-tuition-2/ [https://perma.cc/UZ7H-PKVE] (hereinafter NEW AM.); 20 U.S.C.

§ 1075.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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individual expenses. 74 When the HEA was reauthorized in 1980,75 the
basic standards for COA had been established, but minor amendments
were made. 76 In 1986 when the Reagan administration attempted to adjust
the needs analysis formula for federal student loans to decrease federal
student aid spending, the Democratic-majority Congress restricted any
77
and all regulation of COA calculation by the Department of Education.
As a result, each school's financial aid office, not the federal government,
78
has complete discretion over the calculation of their school's COA.
When the HEA was reauthorized as the Higher Education Opportunity
Act (HEOA), it mandated that "each postsecondary institution in the
United States that participates in the Title IV student aid programs ... post
a net price calculator on its Web site that uses institutional data to provide
estimated net price information to current and prospective students and
79
their families based on a student's individual circumstances." To assist
the postsecondary institutions with this requirement, the National Center
for Education Statistics (NCES), Office of Postsecondary Education
(OPE), and the IT Innovation Solutions Corp. partnered to create a fully
functional net price calculator available to all Title IV postsecondary
institutions for use on their institutional websites. 80
B. Defining Cost of Attendance
COA is generally defined as the average cost to attend a specific
college for a single academic year, including both fall and spring
semesters.81 It typically includes tuition and fees, room and board, books
82
On the Free
and supplies, transportation, and personal expenses.
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) website, COA is simply
defined as the "total amount it will cost you to go to college each year."83
In addition to the items included above in the generally accepted
definition, FAFSA describes COA as including loan fees, dependent care,
and personal computer allowances, if applicable. 84
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Dancy & Fishman, supra note 70.
Id.
See id.
79. Net Price Calculator Information Center, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.

ed.gov/ipeds/report-your-data/resource-center-net-price

[https://perma.cc/9EF7-D9KX] (Mar. 5,

2019).
80. Net Price Calculator Template,

INOVAS,

http://www.inovas.net/Projects/Project/21

[https://perma.cc/TS9D-U96U] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
81. COLL. DATA, supra note 28.
82. Id.
83. Cost of Attendance, FAFSA, https://studentaid.gov/help-center/answers/article/what-

does-cost-of-attendance-mean [https://perma.cc/2JLU-QJ2E] (last visited Mar. 27, 2019).
84. Id
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To keep up with changes in these costs, COA can be updated yearly,
but each school determines how often their COA is updated. 85 Schools
can calculate multiple COAs based on the most common student
circumstances, like whether the student is in-state or out-of-state or by
the type of housing the student chooses. 8 6
In practice, each school has discretion as to which categories to
include in their COA and how they determine an accurate cost for each
category.87 The page on the NCAA website dedicated to Questions and
Answers about COA emphasizes the discretion of each school in
calculating their own COA. 88 In response to questions related to the
variation in amount, timing, and method of distribution of COA stipends
to student-athletes, the NCAA's answers remain focused on each school's
discretion in calculating their COA. 89
In 2010, Congress updated the statutory defmition of Cost of
Attendance, they defined Cost of Attendance as including:
(1) tuition and fees normally assessed a student carrying the
same academic workload as determined by the institution,
and including costs for rental or purchase of any equipment,
materials, or supplies required of all students in the same
course of study;
(2) an allowance for books, supplies, transportation, and
miscellaneous personal expenses, including a reasonable
allowance for the documented rental or purchase of a
personal computer, for a student attending the institution on
at least a half-time basis, as determined by the institution;
(3) an allowance (as determined by the institution) for room
and board costs incurred by the student which-(A) shall be an allowance determined by the institution for a
student without dependents residing at home with parents;
(B) for students without dependents residing in
institutionally owned or operated housing, shall be a
standard allowance determined by the institution based on
the amount normally assessed most of its residents for room
and board;

85. See Jake New, More Money ... If You Can Play Ball, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 12,
2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/08/12/colleges-inflate-full-costattendance-numbers-increasing-stipends-athletes [https://perma.cc/JG96-TXZZ].
86. COLL. DATA, supra note 28.
87. Dancy & Fishman, supra note 70.
88. Cost of attendance Q&A, NCAA (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.ncaa.com/news/
ncaa/article/2015-09-03/cost-attendance-qa [https://perma.cc/6575-AGW2].

89. Id.
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(C) for students who live in housing located on a military
base or for which a basic allowance is provided under section
403(b) of Title 37, shall be an allowance based on the
expenses reasonably incurred by such students for board but
not for room; and
(D) for all other students shall be an allowance based on the
expenses reasonably incurred by such students for room and
board;

(12) for a student who receives a loan under this or any other
Federal law, or, at the option of the institution, a
conventional student loan incurred by the student to cover a
student's cost of attendance at the institution, an allowance
for the actual cost of any loan fee, origination fee, or
insurance premium charged to such student or such parent
on such loan, or the average cost of any such fee or premium
charged by the Secretary, lender, or guaranty agency making
or insuring such loan, as the case may be.9
Between these diverse definitions of COA and the broad discretion
given to schools, it is difficult for institutions to accurately calculate an
average COA. 9 1 Students come from .different locations with diverse
92
socioeconomic statuses and home lives that affect their individual COA.
Even without these unavoidable variables, each student has unique needs
and preferences depending on their way of life. 93 Finding a single
balanced COA that is appropriate for the "average" student seems

impossible.

4

One study found that more than one-third of schools underestimated
actual living expenses by more than $3,000 and 11% of institutions
overestimated by more than $3,000-meaning close to half of the COAs
calculated by institutions are off by a significant margin. 95 This can have
a big impact on both student-athletes who get COA as a stipend and nonathletes living off student loans in the full COA amount, the cap for
federal student loans. 9 6

90. 20 U.S.C. § 108711(2010).
91. See Dancy & Fishman, supra note 70.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Jill Barshay, Underestimating the True Cost of College, U.S. NEWS (June 1, 2015,

11:58 AM),

https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/06/01/underestimating-the-true-cost-

of-college.
96. See id.
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The study also showed that the hardest group for institutions to
accurately calculate COA for is the 50% of college students who live off
campus, away from their parents and do not use dining hall plans for
food. 97 Within athletics, inaccuracy for such a large portion of studentathletes could lead to problems both for the student-athlete, who needs
the stipend to pay for rent and food, or the athletic department, who may
be putting unnecessary strain on the budget with mistakenly high COA
distributions.
A student's actual COA varies, depending on many things including
transportation, textbook prices, and family environment. Each of these
variables depends on real-life situations that can change in an instant.
C. Implicationsof the Grant-In-Aid Cap Being Cost of Attendance
1. Lack of Consistency in Calculation and Regulation
In addition to the lack of consistency in defining COA, there is also a
lack of consistency in regulating individual school's COA calculations.
Critics of the current system worry athletics departments improperly
influence the entire school's COA to benefit athletes, which harms the
average student. Previously, variance in COA between institutions was
not controversial, as it was attributable to actual differences in the cost of
living in different cities and states. Generally, COA did not fluctuate from
year to year at a single institution. Nonetheless, once COA became part
of the collegiate athletics landscape, the variance became increasingly
controversial. "The NCAA estimated at the time that the stipends would
increase aid amounts by about $2,500 per athlete, or about $30 million a
year across all programs," an estimate that fell short for many institutions
due to recent sizable increases in COA. 98 The NCAA still refers all
questions about changes in COA to the individual institutions.99
Individual schools can have a major impact on their COA due to the broad
discretion given to them by statute and the continuing deference given by
the NCAA.' 00
Since COA was adopted as the grant-in-aid cap in 2015, many schools
COA has increased significantly. 10 1 For example, the University of
Georgia (UGA) recently increased the transportation costs and
miscellaneous expenses portions of their COA.10 2 Coincidentally,
academic scholarships that are typically available to non-athletes at UGA

97. See id
98. New, supra note 85.

99. FAFSA, supra note 83.
100. See New, supra note 85; see also NEW AM., supra note 71.
101. New, supra note 85.

102. Id.
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did not include either of these sections. 103 Increases in the portions of
COA not covered by academic scholarships have become more common
04
since COA was adopted as the grant-in-aid cap.1 Increases in these
portions of COA increase the total value of an athletic scholarship
without increasing the total value of an academic scholarship, a
manifestation of the competing pressures on financial aid by athletic
departments to increase COA or to decrease COA as to not to scare
prospective students with a high COA.10 5 "[U]nless the stipends become
standardized in some way, full cost-of-attendance numbers could
rise . .. ]106
2. Use as a Recruiting Tool
The NASFAA is worried about COA stipends being used as a
recruiting tool and whether that use will lead to COA increases due to
07
increased pressure on financial aid from athletic departments.1 This
worry is supported by college coaches blatantly stating that they use their
COA in recruiting. By way of example, University of Alabama's
("Alabama") head football coach said "he was concerned about the large
discrepancies that existed between individual colleges' full cost-ofattendance numbers."' 0 8 Alabama's COA stipend, $3,463 for the 20142015 school year, was in the middle of the Southeastern Conference
(SEC), while Auburn University's COA stipend was over $5,000 for the
same year.1 09 After Saban's comments, Alabama increased its COA to
$5,386 for out-of-state students and $4,172 for in-state students-one of
the highest COA stipends in the country." 0
The pressure exerted by athletic departments on financial aid offices
to increase the COA originates from an athletic department's need to
attract the top high school recruits. 1 1 Athletic departments want to bring
in the best recruits-especially in football and men's basketball1 2 The general
because those sports generate the most revenue.
103. Id.
104. Hillary Hoffower, College is more expensive than it's ever been, and the 5 reasonswhy
suggest it's only going to get worse, Bus. INSIDER (June 26, 2019, 10:23 AM),
2
https://www.businessinsider.com/why-is-college-so-expensive- 018-4 [https://perma.cc/U9ABHAPX].

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. New, supra note 85.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Elton Alexander, New NCAA rule adds money to athletic scholarships, but can strain

athletic budgets,

CLEVELAND.COM,

https://www.cleveland.com/sports/college/

2

015/05/new_

ncaaruleadds money toat.html [https://perma.cc/C5D2-9BYB] (Jan. 11, 2019).
112. Victoria Lee Blackstone, How Much Money Do College Sports Generate?, ZACKS
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assumption is that the higher an individual school's COA is, the more
likely a recruit will be interested in going there." 3 The head football
coach at Pennsylvania State University (Penn State), James Franklin,
admitted that he is going to use Penn State's high COA in recruiting." 4
He plans to use COA in the same way he uses his football players'
graduation rates, to compare Penn State's COA to other school's COAs
to show recruits that Penn State is at the top.115
At UGA, Mark Richt, the head football coach at the time, said in a
speech to UGA football fans, "We've been very creative in getting our
number to a good spot."1 6 Richt later said there were "some things that
can be done in a creative way that is well within the rules that can get us
in pretty good shape on [the COA] front."'" David Ridpath, Professor of
Sports Administration at Ohio University, agrees that financial aid offices
are likely getting creative with COA estimates in response to pressures
from coaches, but it is unlikely that any rules are being broken. 18
Although these adjustments and recalculations seem fishy,1 9 they
likely happened before 2015, when the grant-in-aid cap was set to COA,
except in the other direction.1 2 0 Before COA was established as a grantin-aid cap, schools wanted their COA as low as possible to attract
potential nonathletes who may have been dissuaded by a high COA
estimate. 121 The O'Bannon court seemed unaware that COA is
susceptible to manipulation. 12 2 The rules are rarely broken by these
manipulations because there are barely any rules to be broken.1 2 3
III. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
The discussion in the following sections examines the benefits and
shortcomings of the most popular alternatives to the current grant-in-aid
model. These alternatives range from minor changes to increase
consistency in COA, to major changes, like allowing a free market for
collegiate athletes, that allow athletes to get "fair" market price for their
(Jan. 28, 2019), https://finance.zacks.com/much-money-college-sports-generate-10346.html
[https://perma.cc/E65V-FKXN].
113. New, supra note 85.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

119. New, supra note 85.
120. See Patrick Michael Tutka & Dylan Williams, The Expensive Truth: The Possible Tax
ImplicationsRelated to Scholarship and Cost of Attendance Paymentsfor Athletes, 27 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS SPORT 145, 146 (2017).

121. See id. at 145.
122. O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
123. See New, supra note 85.
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athletic achievements. This Note argues that the best solution is to stick
with the current model of compensation, with COA as the grant-in-aid
cap, while reforming COA calculation and regulation to increase
consistency between schools and to ensure the calculations accurately
represent educational expenses, as the Ninth Circuit intended.
A. Stick with COA as the Grant-in-AidCap, but Alter Proceduresto
Increase Consistency
Moving forward, this Note suggests creating a consistent method of
calculation for COA and increasing transparency of how COA is
calculated. A method that would allow COA to remain directly related to
educational expenses, that would implement publishing requirements to
increase transparency to the public, and that would increase regulation of
both the calculation and publishing of COA.
Starting in 2015, many NCAA schools distributed stipends to their
24
student-athletes in amounts equal to the school's COA,1 but this method
of student-athlete compensation has created issues related to the
calculation and regulation of COA.
1. Consistent Calculation
The most obvious issue with using COA as the cap for grant-in-aid is
the faulty method of COA calculation. Neither congressional nor NCAA
legislation provides a consistent formula for COA calculation.12 5 Instead,
each school's financial aid office is given broad discretion, allowing them
to include or exclude the various COA categories suggested by the
legislation. 126 This leads to variation in COAs between similarly
situated1 27 schools and even between the same school in different
years.1 2 8 Between a lack of definitive method of calculation and the
discretion given to financial aid offices, COA is often not an accurate
representation of the actual COA for a student to attend that school.
Whether the COA is higher or lower than the student needs, this faulty
calculation leads to extra stress either on the student, who needs more

124. See, e.g., Blair Kerkhoff & Tod Palmer, They're not paychecks, but major college
athletes got extra scholarshipstipendsfor first time this school year, KAN. CITY STAR (June 30,
6 06 2 9 2
7 .html.
2016, 1:44 PM), https://www.kansascity.com/sports/college/article8
125. See FAFSA, supra note 83.
126. Federal Cost Datafor Students Living at Home Are Significantly Understated, INST.
FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS (May 24, 2016), https://ticas.org/accountability/federal-cost-data-

students-living-home-are-significantly-understated/ [https://perma.cc/B9NV-2XT5].
127. See COLL. DATA, supra note 28.
128. Vincent Tuminiello II, The Changing Face of College Athletics: O'Bannon and Cost of
Attendance, MARTINDALE (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.martindale.com/legal-news/article_
taylor-porter-brooks-phillips-llp_2505989.htm.
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money, or on the athletic department, who is distributing unnecessarily
high stipends to their student-athletes.
Legally, COA calculation and its relationship to educational expenses
is the method's greatest strength. As currently defined, COA is
technically comprised of "educational expenses," 12 9 satisfying the NCAA
requirement that payments to student-athletes are directly related to
educational expenses. 130 To preserve amateurism within college sports,
courts allow only payments related to education expenses, the main
reason they chose COA as the grant-in-aid cap. 3 1 In reality, as COA
becomes more important, this poorly regulated measure will shift from a
measure of educational expenses towards a representation of a school's
athletic stature. The statutory definition and calculation methods for COA
need to be reformed.
The relationship between the payment and education expenses is
important because it allows student-athletes to remain amateurs while
still being paid; any payments not related to educational expenses impede
the student-athlete's amateurism.1 3 2 In both the district court and Ninth
Circuit O'Bannon decisions, the limited explanation surrounding the
choice of COA as the grant-in-aid cap focused on its clear relation to
educational expenses.1 3 3 Those decisions did not discuss, as I have here,
the reality of COA calculation; that broad discretion is given to individual
schools to calculate COA without any regulation. In practice, at schools
like UGA and Alabama, COA has risen sharply since it was designated
as the grant-in-aid cap. 134
Instead of allowing schools to calculate their own COA, there should
be required COA calculations, whether passed by Congress or the NCAA,
that establish a standardized set of categories and methods for calculation.
These reforms would alleviate many of the issues surrounding COA
calculation as they relate to concerns of amateurism. This guidance for

129. See 20 U.S.C. § 108711(2010).
130. O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015).
131. See O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 974 (N.D. Cal.
2014); O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076; Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.

of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 119 n.65 (1984) (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1309 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
132. See O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075.
133. Id. at 1075 (noting "the evidence at trial showed that the grant- in-aid cap has no relation
whatsoever to the procompetitive purposes of the NCAA: by the NCAA's own standards, studentathletes remain amateurs as long as any money paid to them goes to cover legitimate educational
expenses"); O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 977 ("The NCAA's former president, the late Walter
Byers, testified during his 2007 deposition, for instance, that the NCAA's decision to remove
incidental expenses from the grant-in-aid coverage in 1975 was not motivated by a desire to
increase consumer demand for its product.").
134. See New, supra note 85.
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COA calculation would keep true to the court's intent of limiting studentathlete payment to education-related expenses.
2. Increased Transparency
These new regulations, wherever they come from, should also
increase transparency by requiring each school to publish a breakdown
of each of their COA categories on their website, including where they
got their estimates. 135 This detailed breakdown will lead to more accurate
COA calculations because the category totals would be smaller and easier
to adjust. 136 The transparency would be taken further by requiring each
school to post their exact COA construction policy on its website,
including how the number is calculated and how frequently their COA
will be updated. 137 Requiring individual institutions to post the discrete
details COA calculation at their school would give the NCAA, athletic
department, student-athletes, and nonathletes a better idea of what COA
truly represents. A final suggestion for increasing consistency requires
each school to use two sources to calculate each discrete COA category,
38
including the average of the two in the final calculation.1 Under this
method, schools would be required to list both of their sources for each
category of COA, allowing potential students, athletes, and nonathletes,
a deeper understanding into the makeup of their school's COA. These
requirements, in addition to the reformation of the statutory definition,
would increase COA consistency between years at the same school and
between similarly situated schools.
Another improvement necessary for COA to become an effective
grant-in-aid cap is increased regulation by either the Department of
Education or the NCAA. Since the 1980's, when Congress took
regulatory control over COA out of the Department of Education's hands,
COA has played an increasingly important role in the college education
of both athletes and nonathletes.1 39 Over the years there is no doubt that
schools have manipulated their COA to meet their needs and that it has
become more prevalent since COA became the grant-in-aid cap for
athletic departments, yet no rules are being violated.
3. Nationwide Regulation
Allowing the Department of Education or the NCAA to regulate COA
calculation would provide the consistency that is desired by many across
135. Brittany Hackett, Cost of Attendance: Is More Standardization Needed?, NASFAA
(June 27, 2017), https://www.nasfaa.org/news-item/12477/Costof_Attendance_Is_More_

StandardizationNeeded_8_30_-_9_30_am [https://perma.cc/R33M-3LW2].
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Dancy & Fishman, supra note 70.
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the NCAA.1 4 0 Two main methods of regulation have been suggested. The
first is to provide a large-scale algorithm or COA calculator for use by
each school's financial aid office.1 4 1 Nationwide use of a single calculator
would allow each school's financial aid office to base their COA on an
underlying database with consistent, but relevant data for each U.S.
county. 14 2 This method has been already adopted on a small scale by
schools who have already put a COA calculator specific to their school
online.1 43 In fact, a country-wide COA calculator has already been
created by a team using the MIT cost-of-living calculator based on data
from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department
of Agriculture, and Bureau of Labor Statistics.'" This method, compared
to the other methods, would involve more regulation of the underlying
calculator than of calculated COA.
The second suggested method of regulation is to establish a limited
number of permitted ways to define and calculate COA. 145 Each
institution could choose the method which they felt fit best for them, but
they would be required to list the method chosen wherever their COA is
posted.1 4 6 This method would provide more flexibility than a single COA
calculation, but it would provide more guidance than our current system.
Through consistent statutory calculation, increased transparency, and
increased regulation, COA could become what the courts intended it to
be, a meaningful indicator of how much it costs to attend fall and spring
semesters at each NCAA institution. As Nick Saban said, "[w]hen we
don't have a cap that makes it equal for everybody, it really goes against
everything ... we've tried to do for parity [in the NCAA]."'1 47
B. Free Market in College Athletics
The most commonly discussed alternative compensation model for
collegiate athletics, especially in the past few years, is allowing athletes
to be paid, either by a third party or their school, in amounts unrelated to
their educational expenses. There are two types of pay-for-play
supporters, those who advocate for a completely free market1 4 8 and those
140. Id.
141. Emma Kerr, What to Know About a College's Net Price Calculator, U.S. NEWS (May
8, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-for-college/artices
/2019-05-08/what-to-know-about-a-colleges-net-price-calculator.

142. Id.
143. Id
144. Barshay, supra note 95.
145. See Dancy & Fishman, supra note 70.

146. See id.
147. New, supra note 85.
148. Madisen Martinez, Should College Student-Athletes Be Paid?Both Sides of the Debate,
COLLEGEXPRESS (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.collegexpress.com/articles-and-advice/athletics/

blog/should-college-student-athletes-be-paid-both-sides-debate/

[https://perma.cc/Z5T8-WAW6];
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who advocate for allowing student-athletes to earn money from third
49
The flaw in these
parties for use of the student-athletes NIL.1
alternatives, compared to sticking with COA as the grant-in-aid cap, is
the extraneous and likely large payments a few student-athletes would
receive at the cost of all other student-athletes losing their opportunity to
participate in college athletics.
1. Advantages of a Free Market in College Athletics
Due to the time commitment that collegiate sports demand from
student-athletes-far more than forty hours per week on athletic-related
activities alone-supporters of the free market promote its ability to
0
establish a fair market value for each athlete.' 5 In addition to their usual
demands, the student-athletes are typically required to be away from
school while participating in competitions.15 1
A few student-athletes generate a large amount of revenue that does
not get distributed back to them, but is instead distributed to staff
2
members and used to fund most of a school's nonrevenue sports.1 Under
a free market model, the few student-athletes who do generate revenue
could get a portion of that revenue instead of receiving the same amount
as every other student-athlete.
Finally, advocates of a free market model argue that the NCAA
already allows student-athletes to get paid for their performances through
Olympic Medal payments, especially international athletes who may

Jon Solomon, The History Behindthe Debate Over PayingNCAA Athletes, ASPEN INST. (Apr. 23,
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/history-behind-debate-paying-ncaa-athletes/
2018),
[https://perma.cc/Z4H5-J47W]; Dave Anderson, Top 10 Reasons College Athletes Should Not Be
Paid, LISTLAND (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.listland.com/top-10-reasons-college-athletes-not-

be-paid/ [https://perma.cc/KL7L-4RSV].
149. Reid Carlson, NC Congressman to Introduce Bill To Allow NCAA Athletes to Profit,

SwiM SwAM (Mar. 11, 2019), https://swimswam.com/nc-congressman-to-introduce-bill-to-allowncaa-athletes-to-profit/ [https:/swimswam.com/nc-congressman-to-introduce-bill-to-allow-ncaa
-athletes-to-profit/]; Brian Murphy, NCAA must allow players to profitfrom name and image, NC
Republican's new bill says, NEwS & OBSERVER (Mar. 7, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.news

observer.com/sports/article227181209.html; Solomon, supra note 151; Will Hobson & Emily
Guskin, Poll: Majority of black Americansfavorpaying college athletes; 6 in 10 whites disagree,
WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/poll-majority-of-

black-americans-favor-paying-college-athletes-6-in-10-whites-disagree/2017/09/14/27fa5fc2-98
[https://perma.
df-1 Ie7-87fc-c3f7ee4035c9_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3c33f2e62c57
cc/Z5UK-B7CY].
150. See Martinez, supra note 151; Anderson, supra note 151.
151. Martinez, supra note 151; see also Solomon, supranote 151 (referencing a 2015 survey

in which Division I men's basketball players said during their season they were away from campus
on average 1.7 days a week and missed 2.2 classes).
152. Martinez, supra note 151.
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receive large sums of money for one performance.1 5 3 Since 2001, the
NCAA has allowed U.S. athletes to accept money for medals at the
Olympics, and in 2015, the exception was expanded to international
athletes. 5 4 Joseph Schooling, a member of Singapore's Olympic Team
in 2016 and an Olympic gold medalist, got $740,000 from Singapore for
earning his gold medal.15 5 Under the current NCAA rules, Schooling can
keep that money and still compete as an NCAA athlete.1 56 In addition to
the Olympic Medal exception, the NCAA also allows tennis players to be
considered amateur as long as they made less than $10,000 in earnings
before competing in college tennis.1 7 These exceptions support a
transition to a completely free market because that exists at the Olympic
level; countries may pay athletes whatever they see fit as a reward for
earning an Olympic medal.
2. Disadvantages of the Free Market in College Athletics
In comparison, skeptics of a free market believe "paying athletes
would distort the economics of college sports in a way that would hurt
the broader community of student-athletes, universities, fans[,] and
alumni."1 58 A free-market in college athletics would strongly affect
student-athletes collegiate athletics experience as well as put
unimaginable financial pressures on athletic departments.1 59
Free market payments would shift the focus of recruits away from a
school's total package to only the amount of money they could offer the
recruit. 16 0 Currently, recruits focus on team culture, athletic support, and
academic support, because these things allow student-athletes to be
successful in their sport, classroom, and community. Implementing a free
market would distract recruits while they are making these already
stressful decisions. The reformed COA model would allow recruits and
student-athletes alike to be compensated for their true costs of attending
school with their grant-in-aid, while allowing the "universities, fans, and
alumni" to remain as engaged in college sports as they have always

153. Solomon, supra note 151; Jon Solomon, NCAA prez concerned by Texas swimmer paid
$740K for winning Olympic gold, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 8, 2016, 7:08 PM), https://www.cbs
sports.com/college-football/news/ncaa-president-concerned-by-texas-swimmer-paid-740000-for
-winning-olympic-gold/ [https://perma.cc/T23Y-967Q] [hereinafter CBS SPORTS].
154. CBS SPORTS, supra note 156.
155. Id.

156. Id.
157.

Solomon, supra note 151.

158. Cody J. McDavis, Paying Students to Play Would Ruin College Sports, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/opinion/pay-college-athletes.html?
module=inline [https://perma.cc/5VAG-78VT].
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160. See id
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been.1 6 ' Adding free-market money to the mix would not only affect
62
recruiting but would increase the number of transfers between schools.1
Instead of transferring to a school because it is a better fit, student-athletes
would transfer simply for a bigger paycheck.1 63
Additionally, implementing a free market would put college athletes
in similar situations to professional athletes who deal with holdouts,
create unions, and are subject to lockouts by their league. Between
pulling athletes' focus away from the complete package and having to
deal with business implications of a free market, a free market would add
more distractions to what is supposed to be a time focused solely on
athletic performance and success in the classroom.1
Not only would money cause issues in recruiting, with transfers, and
creating more distractions, but student-athletes would also have to pay
taxes.'S If student-athletes received salary and no scholarship, they
would have to pay taxes and may end up with barely enough to cover
tuition, especially for out-of-state athletes.1 66 For many out-of-state
athletes, the resulting payment from a "full scholarship" would be much
less than is required to maintain housing and other necessities during the
school year. Also, athletic departments would have increased costs
because instead of money going straight to tuition, room, and board
within the institution, it would spend money which would be taxed and
the student-athlete would end up with barely enough to cover tuition.
In addition to concerns about the effect of money on student-athletes,
most schools could not financially sustain a free market. Under our
current model, with a cap on payments to student-athletes, only twenty of
67
the almost 1,000 athletic departments in the country are profitable,' with
68 Adding
most of those being athletic departments at Division I schools.1
large and unpredictable annual payments to men's basketball and football
players would not be feasible and "[o]ne of the first things the colleges
will cut is the other sports at the school."1 69

161. See id.
162. See Martinez, supra note 151.

163. See id.
164. Anderson, supra note 151.
165. See Martinez, supra note 151.

166. Id.
167. McDavis, supra note 161.
168. Anderson, supra note 151; Theodore Ross, Cracking the Cartel, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept.

1, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/122686/dont-pay-college-athletes
cc/S9H8-YHGE].

[https://perma

169. Anderson, supra note 151; see also McDavis, supranote 161 (This article noted that in

2015, North Dakota State University paid COA stipends to sixteen sports adding a $600,000
annual expense to the athletic department's books. Six days later, their rival school, University of
North Dakota (UND) followed suit and distributed COA stipends to many of their athletes. Within
two years, UND had cut five of their sports teams.).
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The University of Wyoming, who adopted the COA stipend policy in
2015, called for a budget reduction one year later.1 70 Without a $4 million
government subsidy, nonrevenue teams likely would have been cut. 17 1
Both Ohio State Athletic Director, Gene Smith, and Chancellor at the
University of Wisconsin, Rebecca Black, have publicly acknowledged
the likelihood that athletic departments would have to cut teams to keep
up with free market payments to basketball and football players. 17 2
Eventually, Olympic sports, which typically do not bring in revenue,
would no longer be associated with colleges and a new system would
need to arise for athletes to pursue elite level training. The U.S. could be
forced to adopt a model similar to that of most other countries where club
sports are run adjacent and unattached to the university system. In
contrast, the reformed COA model would allow all sports, revenuegenerating or not, to remain attached to the schools across the country
because it would only cause minor shifts in athletic department's budgets,
instead of requiring they allocate large amounts to the few revenuegenerating student-athletes.
3. Conclusion
Skeptics and supporters all agree that the market surrounding NCAA
men's basketball and football is massive, but these parties disagree on
where that money should go. Supporters of a free market argue that the
few revenue-generating athletes should benefit by receiving a salary of
an amount determined by the free market, but skeptics focus on the
opportunities that revenue provides for athletes in nonrevenue-generating
sports to participate in college athletics. 173 Legally, implementing a free
market in college athletics would violate an important principle
established by NCAA v. Board of Regents by expanding payments to
student-athletes beyond educational expenses and therefore disrupting
their amateur status.' 7 4 In addition, these payments may ruin the
association between college sports and academics, a key part of the
consumer demand for college sports.1 75
Under the reformed COA model, the Olympic Medal exception would
still exist and permit exceptional athletes to compete and excel on both
the college and international stage. This exception promotes participation
170. McDavis, supra note 161.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. Martinez, supra note 151.

174. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120
(1984).
175. Id. at 101-02 ("The identification of this 'product' with an academic tradition
differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than professional sports to which
it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor league baseball.").
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by elite athletes in their respective college sport and promotes their home
country on the international stage. Encouraging these athletes to
participate in college sports elevates the level of play within college
sports making it more exciting for consumers. Only a small group of
revenue-generating athletes would miss out on the opportunity to
capitalize on that revenue, but if those athletes were interested in
generating revenue, they could choose to play professionally instead of
collegiately. Time demands on student-athletes would not be curbed by
implementing a free market and under the reformed COA model, without
outside monetary influences, student-athletes would be able to spend their
time focused on academic and athletic success. Implementing a free
market for college sports would benefit the few athletes who generate
revenue while destroying the opportunity for nonrevenue sports athletes
76
to play their sport within collegiate athletics.1
C. Third-PartyPayments for NIL Use
The NCAA could also decide to allow student-athletes to be paid only
by third parties for the use of their NIL. Currently, NCAA bylaws forbid
student-athletes or their employers from using their NILs to promote
businesses to take advantage of the student-athlete's reputation. 177 The
O'Bannon court determined that a market for athlete NILs would exist,
considering that the "Name & Likeness" provisions in the right to telecast
contracts are key provisions for broadcasting the most popular college
basketball and football games on television.1 7 8 The court found not only
was there a market for NILs in broadcast, but also for videogames,
rebroadcasts, and advertisements.1 79
Mark Walker, a congressman from North Carolina, recently proposed
80
a new bill in Congress: the Student-Athlete Equity Act.1 This bill would
alter the definition of a qualified amateur sports organization to allow
payments from third parties1 8 1 to the 99.4% of collegiate athletes who
will not go on to play professionally. 8 2 Condoleezza Rice, former chair
of the NCAA's Commission on College Basketball, endorsed allowing
student-athletes to profit from the use of their NIL as long as the NCAA
establishes some regulations.' 8 3 In addition to support from people within
176. McDavis, supra note 161.

177. 2020-21 NCAA Division I Manual, Art. 12 Amateurism and Athletics Eligibility,
NCAA (Aug. 1, 2020), https://web3.ncaaorg/lsdbi/reports/getReport/90008 [https://perma.cc/
7CH8-GH47].
178. See O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 969 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
179. Id. at 970-71.
180. Carlson, supra note 152.

181. Id.
182. Murphy, supra note 152.

183. Id.
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college sports, 66% of Americans are in favor of allowing players to
make money from third parties for the use of their NILs.' 84 An alternative
to free-for-all use of individual athlete's NILs would be a clearinghouse
with a licensing staff to negotiate deals on behalf of all student-athletes,
like in professional leagues.1 85
In September 2019, California signed a bill into law that permits
college athletes to get paid for their NIL from third parties for activities
like endorsement deals, sponsorships, and autograph signings.1 86 The
catch-the law does not go into effect until 2023-gives the NCAA and
maybe even the federal legislature more than three years to iron out the
details.' 87 The bill even contains a clause allowing it to be amended if the
NCAA changes its policies.' 88
After the California bill was signed into law, third-party payments for
NIL became a more mainstream conversation throughout college
athletics. By October 2019, the NCAA Board of Governors voted to
change its policies.' 89 Their policies now give all student-athletes the
opportunity to benefit from their NILs, however the legislation is
currently being drafted and there were no details released.1 90 Members of
the Board of Governors along with members of the working group on
NIL payments emphasized the complexity of the issue and the importance
of developing a solution that works for all of the NCAA's members and
all of the student-athletes.' 9
The California bill is now one of many bills in state legislatures
creating rules and regulations for third-party payments for studentathlete's NILs.1 92 More than 38 states have now introduced bills
regarding payment of student-athletes for use of their NIL.193 The
184. Solomon, supra note 151; Hobson & Guskin, supra note 152.

185. Solomon, supra note 151.
186. Wil I Hobson & Ben Strauss, The Californiagovernorsigned a law to let NCAA athletes
get paid It's unclearwhat's next, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2019, 11:08 AM), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/sports/colleges/california-lawmakers-voted-to-let-ncaa-athletes-get-paid-its-unclear

-whats-next/2019/09/10/80d0a324-d3e6-11e9-9343-40db57cf6abdstory.html

[https://perma.cc/

9MVP-UYHM].

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Emily Caldwell, Change to name, image, likeness policy will ultimately require new
federal law, OHIO ST. NEWS (Dec. 3, 2019), https://news.osu.edu/change-to-name-imagelikeness-policy-will-ultimately-require-new-federal-law/ [https://perma.cc/VQP3-NXGU].

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Reid Wilson, CaliforniaInspires Other States to Push to Pay College Athletes, THE
HILL (Oct. 4, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/464268-californiainspires-other-states-to-push-to-pay-college-athletes [https://perma.cc/MX7N-RTFM].
193 Gregg E. Clifton and John G. Long, State Name, Image and Likeness Laws With July
I" Effective Dates Continue to Grow, NAT'L L. REV. (May 7, 2021), https://www.natlawreview
.com/article/state-name-image-and-likeness-laws-july- 1st-effective-dates-continue-to-grow
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processes, procedures, and effective dates of these laws vary by state,
with five states passing laws effective July 1, 2021.194 For ease of
application, the NCAA would rather have a singular piece of federal
legislation regulating third-party payments for student-athlete's NILs
rather than a separate piece of legislation for each state.1 95 Nevertheless,
Mark Emmert, President of the NCAA, confirmed he will encourage the
Board of Directors of the NCAA to approve guidance on third-party
payments for student-athlete's NIL before the previously-discussed July
1st effective date of five related state laws.1 96 To date, the NCAA has not
provided any foreshadowing of the processes and procedures involved in
the guidance considered by the Board of Directors.
In addition to the complications state or federal legislation could
bring, this alternative compensation model could lead to commercial
exploitation of the student-athletes. In O'Bannon, the court noted that
"[a]llowing student-athletes to endorse commercial products would
undermine the efforts of both the NCAA and its member schools to
97
protect against the 'commercial exploitation' of student-athletes."1
Currently, this option is not legally viable because the payments would
be unrelated to educational expenses. Under the reformed COA model,
student-athletes would receive a stipend in an amount equal to the full
and accurate costs of attending their school, without outside influences
like sponsors distracting them from academic or athletic success.
D. Continue with the CurrentModel
The final suggestion is to keep the current model and allow high
school recruits that would rather be paid to play somewhere other than
college sports. Successful high school athletes who would rather be paid
can always choose to become a professional athlete instead of a college
student-athlete. Talented high school athletes in any sport can o
98
professional by joining a professional league abroad or within the U.S.,
[https://perma.cc/EQ9M-KS861.
194. Id.
195. Dan Wolken, NCAA president Mark Emmert: We need helpfrom Congress on athlete
name, image, likeness, USA TODAY (DEC. 11, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/college/2019/12/1 1/ncaa-president-mark-emmert-wants-congress-aid-name-image-likeness

/4401102002/ https://perma.cc/MFS9-Z3GY].
196. Dan Murphy, NCAA PresidentMark Emmert pushing for NIL action before or near
July 1, ABC NEWS (May 8, 2021 10:59 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/ncaa-president4

mark-emmert-pushing-nil-action-july/story?id=7757 71 #:-:text=NCAA%20president%20
%
20July%2
Mark%20Emmert%20pushing%20fo%/o20NIL%20action%20before%20r%20near
2
01,-ByDAN%20MURPHY&text=That20date%20coincides%20with%20when,likeness% 0
0
for/o20the%20first /o20time.
197. Murphy, supra note 152; O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d
955, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff'd inpart, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
198. McDavis, supra note 161.
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but typically a college scholarship is worth more than the potential
payments as a professional athlete.1 99 The "going pro" option is there,
regardless of the sport, but has always been the route less traveled by the
most successful high school athletes. Barring a major change by a
professional league in their rules regarding athletes transitioning directly
from high school to professional, the status quo ofNCAA dominance will
remain. Reformation of the COA process would provide a balanced
environment for student-athletes; one where they can succeed both
internationally and within collegiate athletics while getting their
education and actual living expenses paid for.
CONCLUSION

Based on O'Bannon, COA calculation and regulation, as well as the
benefits and pitfalls of the proposed alternatives, the best compensation
model for college athletes is to reform COA calculation and regulation.
This option, compared to a free market or allowing payments for NIL, is
a middle ground by allowing student-athletes to be compensated for the
maximum of their educational expenses, but not in over-the-top amounts
that would put all of college sports in jeopardy. In allowing college
athletics to retain its relationship with colleges, the reformed COA
maintains a key part of consumer demand for college sports because the
student-athletes will be compensated for true educational expenses
without being overcompensated.
Courts have worried
that
overcompensation will lead to disengagement of fans and alumni of all
sports. Implementing a more rigid statutory calculation of COA, in
combination with increasing the transparency and regulation of COA will
move it towards its intended use as a true estimate of educational
expenses for student-athletes.

199. Martinez, supra note 151.
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